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ABSTRACT
While there is a strong recorded correlation between religiosity and Republican Party affiliation, Cuban Amer-
icans report low religiosity but strong support for the GOP (58% of Cuban Americans are affiliated with the 
GOP). This is only one way in which this community is an outlier: Cuban Americans do not behave like other 
Hispanics; do not vote like other religious groups; are more liberal than the average Republican voter; and 
have not experienced the religious revival often observed in citizens of former communist regimes. These 
particularities suggest that Cuban Americans’ reaction is very specific to the combination of their experienc-
es in the U.S. and in Cuba, including the island’s feeble religious history. This article explores the ways in 
which Cuban American support for the GOP is divorced from religiosity, and proposes that Cuban Ameri-
can affiliation with the Republican Party is instead motivated by a strong rejection of socialism, support for 
“law and order” policies in the U.S., and a desire to use America’s foreign policy to produce change in Cuba. 
The Cuban Vote: How a very unreligious group votes for 




The Latino vote in the 2020 presidential elections made the head-
lines, encouraging a discussion about the fact that Latinos are not 
a monolith and have different motivations for voting. While recog-
nizing this diversity is important, it is also important to note that the 
majority of Latinos, 70%, voted for President Biden (Latino Deci-
sions, 2020). It seems as if despite differences, there are unifying 
factors in this population that result in similar political needs aligned 
with support for the Democratic party. Cuban Americans, however, 
stand out from other Latino groups and the overall average, show-
ing majority support for the Republican party. By October of 2020, 
survey data showed that 58% of Cuban Americans were affiliated 
with the GOP, compared with only 32% of Non-Cuban Hispanics 
in the U.S (Krogstad, 2020). These numbers are comparable to the 
percentages of Latinos who voted for President Trump in the 2016 
election. In fact, this has been the trend for years. Although there 
had been a steady if slow-moving decline in their Republican sup-
port until 2014, Cuban Americans have been a stronghold for the 
Republican party for decades, and after 2014, the trend reversed 
and numbers of Cuban Americans Republican voters reached levels 
not seen since the early 2000s (Krogstad, 2014, 2020).
Voting Republican is only one of many singularities that Cuban 
Americans exhibit when compared to the broader Latino popula-
tion in the U.S. Most Cuban Americans are concentrated in Flor-
ida, potentially contributing to the continued status of the state as 
a “swing state.” In 2018, Cuban Americans, closely followed by 
Puerto Ricans, made up the largest Hispanic population eligible to 
vote. They have also traditionally shown the highest voter turnout 
among all Latino groups (Krogstad, 2020). These trends show high 
levels of political engagement from the Cuban American popula-
tion and a bias for the Republican party. 
Strong support for the Republican Party is often correlated with 
religiosity. Robert Putnam and David Campbell’s book American 
Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us describes the rise and 
effect of the “God gap” in America. The “gap” refers to the correla-
tion between religious people, in particular Christians, and the Re-
publican party, mostly due to their shared conservative social views. 
Additionally, scholarly work on religious repression in authoritari-
an states reveals that this repression is often followed by religious 
revival: given Cuba’s communist government’s history of religious 
repression, it made sense that Cubans might fit this model, and might 
be likely to become more religious after escaping the restrictions of 
Cuba, aligning them with other religious Republican voters. Further 
study, however, quickly reveals that religiosity does not play a con-
siderable role in Cuban Americans’ Republican support.
This article examines the complex relationship, or lack thereof, 
between religiosity and partisanship among Cuban Americans. It 
begins by offering a brief literature review; analyzes statistics and 
survey data; and engages with potential reasons for why strong Re-
publican support divorced from religiosity continues to be prevalent 
among Cuban Americans. This paper proposes that the Cuban Amer-
ican vote is very particular and does not conform to the voting pattern 
of many other groups, such as the average Republican voter, other 
Hispanics, citizens of former religiously repressive states, and even 
Cubans who remain on the island. Cuban Americans exhibit very low 
“Voting Republican is only one of many 
singularities that Cuban Americans exhibit 
when compared to the broader Latino 
population in the U.S.”
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levels of religiosity, so it is not their socially conservative views that 
link them to the Republican party. Instead, their affiliation with the 
Republican party is motivated by traditionally loose religious ties, a 
strong rejection of socialism, and a desire to produce change in Cuba.
LITERATURE REVIEW
I. Religiosity and the Republican Party 
Existing literature explores the strong links between religion and 
voting in the United States, as both the religious-secular spectrum 
and the Republican-Democratic spectrum become more polarized. 
In American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us, Robert 
Putnam and David Campbell offer a comprehensive review of the 
many changes that have ultimately led to a rise of the religious 
Right. Between the 1950s and 1980s, Americans experienced a se-
ries of “shocks” and “aftershocks” that sent people to the secular 
or religious end of the spectrum. After the perceived moral decline 
of the 1960s, many people entered the religious end of the spec-
trum more committed than ever. The Republican party maximized 
this opportunity to consolidate support from an already organized 
group who shared their socially conservative values. Although it 
was not conceived as an explicitly political movement, it became 
one as abortion and homosexuality emerged as divisive questions 
for the Democratic and the Republican parties. Religious commu-
nities openly welcomed the association with the Republican party, 
and churches increasingly attracted supporters of the Republican 
party, giving rise to what Putnam and Campbell call “the God gap” 
(Putnam & Campbell, 2012). As the link between religion and par-
tisanship intensified up to the early 1990s, so did the correlation 
between Republican ideology and attendance at religious services 
that continues today (Pew Research, 2014).  
Latino Catholics played a significant role in this process in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s when a new secularist tendency con-
ceived in response to the rise of the religious Right became visible. 
Many youths rejected the politicization of religion and embraced a 
secular lifestyle: the association of religion with Republican par-
ty conservative values, and its perceived incompatibility with the 
youth’s progressive views, made remaining religiously unaffiliated 
increasingly appealing. While the Catholic Church was near col-
lapse during these years, strong continued affiliation from immi-
grant Latino Catholics kept it from disintegrating. The new arrivals 
offered a timely replacement for the American-born religiously dis-
illusioned youth; in return, the Church debatably became the only 
institution facilitating the integration of Latino immigrants into the 
larger society. In addition to the high levels of Catholicism already 
practiced by many Hispanics in their native countries, this may be 
a reason why strong links remain between the Catholic Church and 
the Latino population. As we will explore below, this trend does not 
extend to Cuban-Americans.
II. Religiosity and religious repression 
As science and technology have developed globally, many have 
expected the fulfillment of the “secularization thesis,” which pre-
dicts the eradication of religion (Toft et al., 2011, p. 1). Contrary to 
expectations, however, religion has not disappeared. Between 1900 
and 2000, the world population practicing Christianity, Islam, and 
Hinduism increased from 50 percent to 64 percent, and almost 80 
percent claimed to believe in God (ibid). Toft et al. explore some of 
the major causes of this religious resurgence, including an ongoing 
quest for religious freedom from the state (Toft et al. 2011, pp. 13-
14). History suggests that religious repression might have actually 
led to renewed religiosity. This was the aftermath of authoritarian 
regimes in Algeria, the Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria, China, 
and Iran, where the state aimed to ban or control religion. After 
these regimes’ collapse, however, religiosity rose sharply  (Toft et 
al. 2011). The two nations with Communist regimes similar to Cu-
ba’s share this trend: in the Soviet Union, there has been a return 
to the Orthodox Church since Communist collapse, and in China, 
a religious resurgence was observed post-Cultural Revolution. This 
pattern suggests that Cuban Americans, who depart a religiously 
oppressive communist regime to emigrate to the United States, 
might also experience religious revivals after they arrive in the U.S. 
and are able to practice religion more openly. The fact that Cuban 
Americans’ political repression on the island was not followed by 
a religious revival in the U.S. invites us to look more closely at the 
particularities of the experience and behaviors of this community. 
It is even more surprising when we examine historical evidence of 
religious repression in Cuba, and particularly when we consider 
that Cubans in Cuba have shown the predicted return to religiosity 
(Goldenziel, 2009).
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA AND THE “CUBAN OUTLIER” IDENTITY 
WITHIN HISPANIC POPULATIONS
I. Political and Religious Profile 
Cuban Americans appear to be an outlier among Republican vot-
ers due to their lack of religiosity and a limited alignment with 
the party’s position on social mores. As of 2013, slightly under 
half of Hispanics of Cuban origin in the U.S. identified as Cath-
olic; 17 percent identified as Protestant; 26 percent self-reported 
as religiously unaffiliated, and the remaining percentage identified 
with other religions (López, 2013). Overall, about 65 percent of 
Cubans and Cuban Americans practiced Christianity, a smaller 
fraction than the 77 percent of non-Cuban Latinos who identi-
fied as Catholic or Protestant. In addition to having lower propor-
tions of religious affiliation, Cuban Americans also have one of 
the lowest rates of regular attendance to religious services com-
pared to Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Central Americans (Pew 
Research, 2006). Cubans are also less likely than other Hispanic 
groups to say that religion is the most important thing in their lives 
(ibid). As mentioned above, most Hispanics self-report as Catho-
lics, and Hispanic Catholics consistently vote Democrat (Smith, 
2020); meanwhile about half of Cuban Americans self-report as 
Catholics, but as previously explained, they overwhelmingly vote 
Republican (López, 2013). There is one caveat important to this 
comparison, which will be explored in more detail below: even 
though many Cuban Americans self-identify as Catholics, Cuban 
Catholicism is not the same one practiced by the rest of Latin 
America due to its fluidity and interrelation with other cultural 
influences of the island.
II. Abortion and homosexuality
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On topics like abortion and homosexuality, which have become so 
influential in political life (and toward which the Republican par-
ty takes a more conservative approach), Cubans show very liberal 
attitudes. Firstly, abortion is not a priority for them. According to a 
2020 Pew research survey, only about two-fifths of Cuban Ameri-
cans said abortion was very important to their decision to vote for a 
2020 presidential candidate (Krogstad, 2020). This survey data also 
shows that Cuban Americans are less opposed to abortion than oth-
er Hispanic groups. Furthermore, there is substantial research doc-
umenting Cuban Americans’ pro-choice support. Cuban Americans 
are much more pro-choice than other Latinos, particularly Mexican 
Americans, who show the highest levels of opposition to abor-
tion (Ellison et al., 2005). Furthermore, within Hispanic groups, 
just having Cuban origins increases the probability of supporting 
pro-choice policies (Bolks et al., 2000). Lastly, to demonstrate how 
deviant Cubans are from trends in the overall Hispanic population 
when it comes to these issues, we only need to look at the fact that 
researchers have concluded that the model of the person most likely 
to be pro-choice among Hispanics is a woman who has not had a 
born-again religious experience, does not have high regard for re-
ligion as an everyday guide, is not “very Catholic,” is feminist, has 
high levels of education and income, is ideologically liberal, and is 
Cuban rather than Mexican American (Bolks et al., 2000). 
Although the data on attitudes toward gay marriage is more limited, 
Miami Dade exit poll data suggests that the majority of Cubans are 
not against gay marriage. In 2004, for example, almost 70 percent 
of Cuban Americans opposed the proposed constitutional amend-
ment to ban gay marriage or had no opinion on the issue (Bishin et 
al., 2008). Even though Miami Dade tends to be more liberal than 
the overall Cuban American population, less than one in three Cu-
ban Americans supported the ban. Opposition to the ban from this 
community was higher than the national numbers, which showed a 
50 percent split. Cuban Americans’ support for gay marriage is not 
reflective of the still-strong opposition from Latino Republicans to 
gay marriage (Lopez & Cuddington, 2013). This liberal attitude 
may have historical roots dating back to the 1980 Mariel boatlift, 
during which thousands of Cubans –many of whom were homosex-
ual and lesbian– escaped the repression on the island and came to 
America (Peña, 2013). The new arrivals, including the gay commu-
nity, created their own culture that became part of the Cuban Exile 
identity of South Florida. 
Overall, Cuban-Americans are a puzzling demographic. They do 
not adhere to the voting patterns of the general Hispanic popula-
tion, nor do they adhere to those of the average Republican Par-
ty supporter. Researchers have concluded that the Cuban vote is 
a version of the controversial “fiscally conservative and socially 
liberal” attitude. Cubans vote very conservatively on issues related 
to political behavior and U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba but vote 
overwhelmingly liberal on social issues (Bishin et al., 2008).
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS: POTENTIAL FORCES IN-
FLUENCING THE IDIOSYNCRASIES OF THE CUBAN VOTE 
How, then, can we explain why Cuban Americans are outliers not 
only in terms of their religious and social viewpoints and their rela-
tionship to the Republican Party, but also in relation to other people 
who experienced religious repression in communist regimes and 
turned to an increased religiosity once restrictions loosened? One 
thing is certainly clear: Cuban Americans are a unique communi-
ty that, when compared with communities that share traits with it, 
does not behave as we might expect. In an attempt to understand 
this unique political identity, this section will explore some poten-
tial forces that may influence the Cuban American vote. 
One factor to consider is Cuba’s enfeebled religious context before 
the 1959 Communist Revolution. This year marks the beginning 
of the Cuban exodus, and on the island, the beginning of increas-
ingly restrictive policies regarding religious practice. Research 
suggests, however, that Cuba was already not very religious be-
fore this period. The Catholic Church was the dominant religious 
institution in Cuba, but even then, it was considerably weaker than 
in any other Latin American country; in 1959, it was certainly the 
weakest Catholic presence in the region (Crahan, 1985). Its frail-
ty derived partly from the Church’s exclusive focus on the urban 
middle class, strong anti-Catholic sentiments as a consequence of 
the Church’s stand during the Cuban Independence War, and di-
verse cultural roots, which gave rise to the practice of santería, an 
Afro-Cuban religion (Crahan 1985, p. 321). This highlights an-
other complexity of Catholicism in Cuba. Because religions that 
had been practiced by enslaved populations remained illegal and 
secret even after slavery was abolished, over time some Cubans 
merged them with Catholicism, syncretized their gods with saints, 
and adopted Catholic rituals like marriage and baptism (Golden-
ziel 2009, p. 183). 
The combination of anti-Catholic colonial sentiments, weakly insti-
tutionalized religion, and “diluted” or syncretized forms of religion 
from the early 20th century onward produced low levels of religi-
osity in Cuba, even before 1959 when the Cuban American popula-
tion in the States started to grow. Growing up in a communist soci-
ety with this low baseline for religiosity could be one of the reasons 
why Cuban Americans are not religious even today (McCleary & 
Barro 2006, p. 62). This historically weak relationship with religion 
and the Church may explain their low church attendance rates and 
liberal views on issues such as abortion, unlike many Republican 
voters.
In the absence of the strong correlation that exists between religios-
ity and Republican affiliation, we need to consider other factors that 
may shape Cuban Americans’ political views. Of these, a strong 
rejection of policies that are perceived or presented as “socialist,” 
an interest in strong “law and order” legislation, and strong convic-
tions regarding foreign policy seem the most significant.
Many Cubans openly report rejection of socialism as the primary 
consideration behind their affiliation with the Republican party de-
spite their different social views. Cuba’s fate has predisposed Cu-
ban Americans to view socialism, communism, and anything that 
resembles them with distrust and to fear of a slide into authoritari-
anism and impoverishment. A proposal perceived to promote free 
health care or free higher education, for example, “scares” them 
as a voting block (Sesin, 2020). They believe that the drawbacks 
of communism outweigh any potential benefits, and fear that in 
pursuing those perceived benefits, the U.S. will inevitably become 
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the same system that they despise. Venezuelan Americans replicate 
Cubans’ support for the GOP; 66% of those eligible to vote last 
August reported their intent to support Trump, including 53% of 
self-identified Democrats (Castillo, 2020). There seem to be simi-
larities and parallels between Venezuelans and  Cubans’ disdain for 
socialism; their voting patterns reaffirm the important and perhaps 
even deciding influence that their former political systems have on 
their partisanship through negative affiliation. The numbers suggest 
that the longer history of the Cuban Americans in the U.S. may 
have entrenched these negative associations further in this commu-
nity than in the Venezuelan American community. 
The Republican Party has long recognized this issue as a priority 
for Cubans (and more recently Venezuelans) and has tailored its 
outreach accordingly. The Trump campaign was able to capitalize 
on this fear of socialism by misrepresenting the Democratic party’s 
aspirations (Martin & Burns, 2020): President Trump pushed the 
narrative that all Democrats are radical leftist and anti-capitalist, re-
sponding to Cuban Americans’ fears and incentivizing them to vote 
Republican to protect against this political change (Licon, 2020). 
He also activated responses in this voter group by appealing to oth-
er priorities; for example, he juxtaposed the Democrats’ intent to 
defund the police with his promise to uphold law and order, which 
many Cuban Americans advocate for. 
These data suggest that an interest in preventing their social and 
political history from repeating in the U.S., rather than religion, is 
what motivates Cubans to vote Republican. Recent arrivals’ voting 
patterns continue to reflect a persistent strong reaction against pro-
posals that are seen to be aligned with socialism: over 75 percent 
of Cubans eligible to vote that arrived between 2010-2015 are reg-
istered Republicans (Grenier & Lai, 2020). Cubans’ negative his-
tory with socialism makes suppressing it in their new country very 
important for them –certainly more so than same-sex marriage or 
abortion. They vote for the Republican party because it explicitly 
campaigns on preventing America from becoming socialist, and 
they do so despite weak religious affiliations. This trend may be 
further reinforced by community ties; since most Cuban-Ameri-
cans settle in Florida, recent immigrants may adopt the commu-
nity’s existing political views, perhaps inspired by their shared ex-
perience, in search of help navigating their new country, or even 
out of fear of behaving against the norms of the group (including 
voting in ways that could lead to accusations of having communist 
leanings). While a shared political viewpoint is currently the norm, 
data suggest that in time, new arrivals may shift voting patterns in 
Cuban American populations. While older immigrants vote Repub-
lican largely due to political reasons, recent immigrants –who tend 
to be of a lower socioeconomic class– are motivated by the island’s 
decaying economy when they shape political views (Kelly, 2020). 
Bishin and Klofstad propose that recent immigrants are responsible 
for modified foreign policy attitudes and decreased support for an-
ti-Castro policies (Girard et al., 2012), among other developments, 
signaling a drastic shift in the Cuban American community party’s 
alignment, even if it will be a very long time before voting patterns 
reflect these changes (Bishin and Klofstad, 2012). Despite these di-
vergent political views, the potential new trend supports the theory 
that experiences on the island, and fear related to those experiences, 
are a major factor in shaping Cuban Americans’ political identity. 
If and when experiences on the island change, Cuban Americans’ 
party affiliation may shift with them; at the moment, however, the 
established community’s fear of socialism continues to be a major 
motivating factor.
A strong reaction to perceived socialist policies is not the only issue 
that helps maintain the affiliation between Cuban Americans and 
the Republican party. Other key issues include the economy, health 
care, violent crime, and foreign policy. These four came out on top 
when Cuban Americans were asked about “very important” issues 
that affected their vote in the 2020 presidential election (Krogstad, 
2020). The economy and healthcare also came out as priorities for 
non-Cuban Hispanics, and so do not require extensive discussion in 
relation to our group of interest. Violent crime and foreign policy, 
however, are significantly more important to Cubans. 
The importance of addressing violent crime may seem like a sur-
prising finding: Cuban Americans’ support for a firm law and order 
approach, a government that strictly enforces rules, increased po-
licing, and their belief in the American dream (which in their view 
can only thrive in a society that strictly controls violence and pro-
tects fair play), all prompt Cuban Americans to prioritize a strong 
stance against violent crimes among their political desires. 
Cubans’ interest in foreign policy is more expected, not least be-
cause the strong anti-socialist stance discussed above may be 
closely linked to this. Specifically, Cuban Americans care about 
foreign policy toward Cuba, although as this has changed and the 
situation on the island has shifted, they have increasingly mixed 
feelings about it. For example, 60 percent of South Florida Cu-
bans support the embargo. At the same time, there is robust support 
for engagement policies concerning the sale of food and medicines 
to the island, maintaining diplomatic relations, and fewer restric-
tions on airline travel to the island (Grenier and Lai, 2020). This 
apparent contradiction may stem from a desire to punish the Cuban 
regime while also protecting Cuban citizens and providing them 
with better services. Public opinion polls among Cuban Americans 
suggest there is cautious hope for some engagement, but for now 
(and potentially as a result of Trump’s targeted campaigning), Cu-
ban Americans are siding with isolationist policies espoused by the 
Republican Party. 
While the factors outlined above appear to be the most robust mo-
tivators for Cuban Americans’ continued vote for the Republican 
Party, it is important to mention that a relatively long history of 
voting this way has had multiplier effects. The long-standing affin-
ity with the right, for example, means that most Cuban Americans 
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who choose to run for office do so as Republicans. This means that 
Cuban American voters looking to see themselves represented in 
a candidate are most likely to find those candidates affiliated with 
the GOP, creating a feedback loop of increasingly stronger links 
between the Cuban American community and the party. 
Overall, Cuban Americans are not sure, “even after 60 years of 
experience, whether isolation or engagement will bring about 
change,” but having a party that is responsive to this need is a pri-
ority for them (Grenier and Lai, 2020). In summary, Cuban Amer-
icans (especially the hardliners) are relying on America’s foreign 
policy to shape the future of Cuba, so they vote for the Republican 
party, which they perceive as being aligned with them on this issue, 
even though they do not share many of the Republican party’s so-
cially conservative values, or its religious leanings.
CONCLUSION
There is a humorous anecdote that summarizes the findings of this 
study: when a Cuban American is asked, “Do you vote Republi-
can or Democrat?” she answers, “I vote Cuban.” Cuban Americans 
have developed a very unique political identity; they do not fit any 
stereotype. They are one of the least religious groups among His-
panics in the U.S. and consistently vote for the most religiously af-
filiated party. Additionally, they have two of the characteristics that 
tend to indicate higher levels of religiosity: they have suffered and 
escaped religious repression from the state, and they are Hispanics. 
While they do support very conservative political leaders, this sup-
port is not representative of a strong religious influence. 
Further study is needed to provide a holistic explanation as to why 
Cuban Americans are such outliers in the Republican Party, but 
these findings offer a starting point. Additionally, Cuban Ameri-
cans have created their own identity that is neither purely Cuban 
nor American, and have been here for over 60 years. Many aspects 
unique to the community they have constructed might not be able to 
be explained through a merely Cuban or American lens. While fur-
ther research is required to fully map this political affinity, it is clear 
that several features of this group play a role in creating this unique 
political identity: Cuban Americans’ strong rejection of socialism; 
their relatively progressive social outlooks, and the influence of 
early LGBTQ immigrants; their loose religious ties counter to the 
trends observed in other Latin countries; their immigration experi-
ences and biculturalism; America’s rising secularism as a whole; 
and social pressures within the community to support or reject a 
political ideology. 
The findings of this study, while preliminary, support the impor-
tance of deconstructing the Hispanic monolith, and of addressing 
the singularities of any population with long-lasting support for a 
political party. They also stress the value of looking beyond major 
trends: while Republican support is often motivated by religiosity, 
Cuban Americans are unlikely to be the only voter bloc for whom 
this is not the case. The complex dynamics encountered during this 
research teach us that the categories on which we often rely when 
we describe political behavior are limited, and cannot describe ev-
erything about a population or its beliefs. Future research in this 
area can tackle questions of how Cuban Americans’ political beliefs 
are shaped both in the context of the U.S. and in the context of 
the community itself (for example, the religious resurgence experi-
enced by Cubans residing in Cuba), and can constructively encour-
age us to consider the limitations of “groupings.” While religiosity 
is not currently a factor, this may change as future immigrant gen-
erations arrive in the U.S.; continued attention to the nuances of this 
political community will support researchers in understanding their 
dynamic and unique behaviors in the context of closely contested 
elections.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper was originally submitted as the final assignment for 
PLSC 415 Religion and Politics, taught by Professor Katherine 
Baldwin, Ph.D, who was of great help. In revising this paper, I have 
also benefited from conversations with my colleague Maria del Mar 
Galindo.
REFERENCES
Bishin, B. G., Cherif, F. M., Gomez, A. S., & Stevens, D. P. (2008). 
The Not so Hard Line? Re-Examining Conservatism in the Cuban 
American Electorate. Re-Examining Conservatism in the Cuban 
American Electorate. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1238402
Bishin, B. G., & Klofstad, C. A. (2012). The political incorporation 
of Cuban Americans. Political Research Quarterly, 65(3), 586-599. 
doi:10.1177/1065912911414589
Bolks, S. M., Evans, D., Polinard, J. T., & Wrinkle, R. D., (2000). 
Core Beliefs and Abortion Attitudes: A Look at Latinos. Social 
Science Quarterly, 81(1), 253-260. https://www.jstor.org/stable/
pdf/42864380.pdf
Castillo, R. (2020, August 28). El voto venezolano en Florida 
favorece a Trump incluso entre demócratas. Retrieved March 
26, 2021, from https://eldiario.com/2020/08/28/encuesta-vo-
to-venezolano-florida-favorece-trump/
Ellison, C. G., Echevarria, S., & Smith, B. (2005). Religion and 
abortion attitudes among US Hispanics: Findings from the 1990 
Latino national political survey. Social Science Quarterly, 86(1), 
192-208. http://www.radicalmath.org/docs/1990LatinoSurvey.pdf
Girard, C., Grenier, G. J., & Gladwin, H. (2012). Exile politics and 
Republican Party Affiliation: The case of Cuban Americans in Mi-
ami*. Social Science Quarterly, 93(1), 42-57. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
6237.2011.00835.x
Goldenziel, J. I. (2009). Sanctioning Faith: Religion, State, 
and US-Cuban Relations. Journal of Law & Politics, 25, 179. 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jill/files/goldenziel_sanctioning_
faith_2009_1_1.pdf
Grenier, G. J., & Lai, Q. (2020). 2018 FIU Cuba Poll: How Cuban 
Americans in Miami View US Policies Toward Cuba. Florida In-
ternational University.
5YURJ | Vol 2.1Spring 2021
Gouin | Religion and Politics
5
Gouin: The Cuban Vote: How a very unreligious group votes for a very religiously affiliated party
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2021
Kelly, W. (2020, November 06). Perspective | The Cuban revo-
lution explains why Younger Cuban Americans supported Trump. 
Retrieved March 19, 2021, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/2020/11/06/cuban-revolution-explains-why-younger-cu-
ban-americans-supported-trump/
Krogstad, J. M. (2014, June 24). After decades of GOP support, 




Krogstad, J. M. (2020, October 2). Most Cuban American voters 
identify as Republican in 2020. Pew Research Center. https://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/02/most-cuban-american-vot-
ers-identify-as-republican-in-2020/.
Latino Decisions. (2020, November 17). American Election Eve 
Poll 2020. Latino Decisions. https://latinodecisions.com/polls-and-
research/american-election-eve-poll-2020/.
Licon, A. G. (2020, October 30). With salsa, caravans, Cubans 
make last push to reelect Trump. AP NEWS. https://apnews.com/
article/donald-trump-race-and-ethnicity-virus-outbreak-cuba-mi-
ami-28275a9dfdc5ac61dcb6cbea04504685.
Lopez, M. H., & Cuddington, D. (2013, June 6). Latinos’ changing 
views of same-sex marriage. Pew Research Center. https://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/19/latinos-changing-views-of-
same-sex-marriage/.
López, G. (2013). Hispanics of Cuban Origin in the United States, 
2013. Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends Project. https://
www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2015/09/15/hispanics-of-cuban-
origin-in-the-unite.
Martin, J., & Burns, A. (2020, November 15). With Trench War-
fare Deepening, Parties Face Unsettled Electoral Map. The 
New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/us/poli-
tics/2020-election-recap-democrats-republicans.html.
McCleary, R. M., & Barro, R. J. (2006). Religion and economy. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2), 49-72.
Peña, S. (2013). Oye Loca: From the Mariel boatlift to gay Cuban 
Miami. U of Minnesota Press
Pew Research Center. (2006, August 25). Cubans in the United 
States. Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends Project. https://
www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2006/08/25/cubans-in-the-united-
states/.
Pew Research Center. (2014, November 5). How the Faithful Vot-
ed. Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project. https://
www.pewforum.org/2014/11/05/how-the-faithful-voted-2014-pre-
liminary-analysis/.
Putnam, R. D., Garrett, S. R., Campbell, D. E. (2012). American 
Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us. United Kingdom: Si-
mon & Schuster.
Sesin, C. (2020, October 21). What’s behind Trump’s gain in Cuban 
American support? NBCNews.com. https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/latino/what-s-behind-trump-s-gain-cuban-american-supp 
ort-n1241601.
Smith, G. A. (2020, September 15). 8 facts about Catholics and 
politics in the U.S. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2020/09/15/8-facts-about-catholics-and-politics-in.
Toft, M. D., Philpott, D., & Shah, T. S. (2011). God’s century: Re-
surgent religion and global politics. WW Norton & Company.
YURJ | Vol 2.1 Spring 20216
Gouin | Religion and Politics
6
The Yale Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 2 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 17
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/17
